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CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN T H E LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
Wright v Hodgkinson 
[2004] EWHC 3091 (Chancery Division) (Hegarty QC) 
Wright v Hodgkinson was a recent High Court decision involving the law of undue 
influence.1 It is submitted that the judge made a fundamental error in deciding the case. 
Given the obvious care displayed in the judgment, and the conscientious attention 
given to both the law and the facts, this is a matter of some concern. It would seem 
that despite the elaborate consideration given to the law of undue influence by the 
House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge,2 and a very considerable academic 
commentary in the area,3 the law of undue influence remains so ill articulated and 
understood that the dispositions of property owners are vulnerable to unpredictable 
challenges. This uncertainty interferes with, and undermines, the policy concerns 
advanced by the doctrine of freedom of disposition (certainty, autonomy, and low 
transaction costs) and threatens to lead to an escalation of transaction costs of 
gratuitous dispositions, and the proliferation of speculative litigation (or the threat 
thereof). 
FACTS 
The transaction at the heart of Wright v Hodgkinson was a transfer in 1997 by Mr 
Wright of his house and adjoining land to himself and Mr Hodgkinson as joint tenants 
in equity.4 In 1997 Mr Wright was an elderly man (75 years old), and Mr Hodgkinson 
was considerably younger (38 years old).5 The transfer was not intended to be an 
outright gift. Mr Hodgkinson agreed to spend a considerable amount of money on 
building works on the land.6 There was also another kind of consideration present. The 
older man hoped that the transfer would result in him having company and support 
in his old age.7 However, the transfer was a clear case of a transaction at an 
undervalue, the value of the interest acquired by the younger man would greatly exceed 
the amount of money he would expend.8 The relationship between the two men was 
a friendship grown out of an acquaintance. In the past Mr Wright had employed as 
seasonal labourers on his farm; first the father of Mr Hodgkinson, and then Mr 
Hodgkinson himself. From 1983 Mr Wright had allowed Mr Hodgkinson to run a 
business from the land that he eventually transferred into their joint names. Mr Wright 
was the social superior of Mr Hodgkinson, and had used his greater wealth to bestow 
favours on the younger man in the past.9 In the words of Mr Wright he had: "taken 
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him [Mr Hodgkinson] under his wing".10 The transfer of the house and land was the 
last, and most valuable, of these favours. Mr Wright had suffered mental deterioration 
by the time the action came to trial, although the evidence was that this deterioration 
had not undermined his capacity at the time of the transfer.11 
The history of the transfer started with an idea of Mr Wright. He thought that Mr 
Hodgkinson should spend his money (received in compensation for an industrial 
injury), on developing Mr Wright's land.12 It was Mr Wright's intention to leave Mr 
Hodgkinson the land when he died, and he felt the money provided an opportunity for 
the friends to arrange matters so that they could be neighbours. He proposed that Mr 
Hodgkinson build an extension to the house, so that they could both live there, 
together with Mr Hodgkinson's family. When Mr Wright died the property would pass 
under his will to Mr Hodgkinson. Upon taking advice, Mr Hodgkinson felt that he 
could not commit his capital to the project without some form of security. Wills, he 
learnt, are revocable, and the original suggestion would have left Mr Hodgkinson and 
his family entirely at the mercy of Mr Wright. Hence, the proposal to transfer the land 
into the joint names of the two friends was first raised.13 In the event the extension was 
never built, as relations between the friends deteriorated after the transfer. This 
deterioration was largely the result of a change of heart on the part of Mr Wright.14 
However, Mr Hodgkinson did expend something of the order of £14,000, and 
considerable time and labour, on developments that had been agreed by the two men.15 
DECISION 
On the facts the judge held that there was:16 "no satisfactory evidence whatever of 
overt acts of improper pressure or coercion on the part of Mr Hodgkinson." Therefore, 
the decision turned on whether there was a presumption of undue influence on the 
facts, and if so whether sufficient evidence had been called to rebut it.17 The judge 
based his analysis on the determination of three issues: the existence of a relationship 
of trust and confidence, reliance, dependence, or vulnerability; the existence of a 
transaction that called out for an explanation; and whether Mr Hodgkinson had 
established that Mr Wright had effected the transfer after giving the matter full, free 
and informed thought.18 It is submitted that the handling of the first issue considered 
by the judge can be criticised as a matter of law.19 
The first issue was concerned with the nature of the relationship between the parties 
to the transfer. A formal objection to the judge's reasoning is that the obvious case to 
consider on the facts found by the judge was Re Brocklehurst.20 It would appear that 
counsel never cited the case. Re Brocklehurst concerned a gift of shooting rights over 
an estate, granted by the estate owner for 99 years to his much younger friend. There 
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was no improper conduct on the part of the donee, and the case turned on whether the 
relationship gave rise to a presumption of undue influence, and if so whether the 
evidence at trial rebutted the presumption. The majority in the Court of Appeal held 
that no such presumption arose.21 In Re Brocklehurst the older donor was the social 
superior of the younger donee, and there was no evidence of dominance by the donee 
over the donor. On the contrary, the evidence suggested that the donor was the 
dominant party to the relationship. The importance of the direction of any asymmetry 
of power in a relationship of trust and confidence was effectively the key issue raised 
by the facts of Re Brocklehurst. The analysis in Wright v Hodgkinson seemed to 
demand no more than that "trust" should exist in a relationship in order to support 
a presumption of undue influence.22 The only other factors given any attention were 
the age disparity and the fact that the older man felt generous impulses towards the 
younger man. All three of these factors identified in Wright v Hodgkinson were also 
present in Re Brocklehurst, and, whilst the cases can clearly be distinguished, it is not 
readily apparent that they should be.23 
ANALYSIS 
It seems wrong that a relationship can support the presumption of undue influence 
where there is no identified vulnerability of the claimant except age,24 nor any 
dominance of the claimant by the defendant. In this failure to identify any basis for 
identifying any "paramount influence"25 in Mr Hodgkinson, the judge in Wright v 
Hodgkinson failed to understand and apply the relevant law, in the same manner as the 
judge at first instance in Re Brocklehurst had fallen into error. 
This error is fundamental, and of more than merely anecdotal importance. As 
Mummery L J has commented:26 
With the increase in home ownership and the rising value of residential property more 
people have more property to dispose of in their lifetime and on death and more people 
expect to benefit substantially from inheritance . . . The elderly and infirm in need of full 
time residential care are vulnerable to suggestions that they should dispose of the home to 
which they are unlikely to return. In my view, these social trends are already leading to 
renewed interest in the law governing the validity of life time dispositions of houses, both 
in and outside the family circle, by the elderly and infirm. 
If, as Mummery L J suggested, this area of law is in the process of expansive 
development it is essential that the courts develop it in a manner that respects the 
autonomy of capable elderly property owners. It would be extremely damaging to this 
category of property owners if the law degenerated into unstructured judicial discretion 
in this area. In Wright v Hodgkinson it seems the judge lost sight of the crucial 
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importance of the direction of "dependence" within a relationship of trust and 
confidence that Mummery L J referred to in his summary of the type of situation that 
called forth the protective operation of the law of undue influence (author's 
emphasis):27 
A house is the most valuable asset that most people own. If a transfer is made by one 
person on the dependent side of a relationship of trust and confidence to a person in whom 
trust and confidence has been placed, it must be shown by the trusted party that the 
disposition was made in the independent exercise of free will after full and informed 
consideration. 
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